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[Abstract]
The emergence and abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies is a 
challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Over the past decades, various 
mechanisms have been suggested which are capable of supporting cooperation1-15.
Imitation dynamics, however, are the most representative microscopic rules of 
human behaviors on studying these mechanisms8-24. Their standard procedure is to 
choose the agent to imitate at random from the population. In the spatial version 
this means a random agent from the neighborhood. Hence, imitation rules do not 
include the possibility to explore the available strategies, and then they have the 
possibility to reach a homogeneous state rapidly when the population size is small4,10.
To prevent evolution stopping, theorists allow for random mutations in addition to 
the imitation dynamics10,21-24. Consequently, if the microscopic rules involve both 
imitation and mutation, the frequency of agents switching to the more successful 
strategy must be higher than that of them transiting to the same target strategy via 
mutation dynamics. Here we show experimentally that the frequency of switching to 
successful strategy approximates to that of mutating to the same strategy. This 
suggests that imitation might play an insignificant role on the behaviors of human 
decision making. In addition, our experiments show that the probabilities of agents 
mutating to different target strategies are significantly distinct. The actual mutation 
theories cannot give us an appropriate explanation to the experimental results. 
Hence, we argue that the mutation dynamics might have evolved for other reasons. 
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[Text] 
Evolutionary game theory is the theory of dynamic adaptation and learning in repeated 
games, and it describes the systems where the agents receive payoffs from the interaction 
with others25,26. Hence, a model in evolutionary game theory is made complete by 
postulating the dynamics that describe how the agents update their strategies in the 
decision stage4. By far the most representative evolutionary dynamics on studying human 
behaviors are imitation, the act of copying or mimicking the actions of others. The 
essence of imitation is that who imitates whom with what probability. The standard 
procedure is that an agent (e.g., x) who has the opportunity to update its strategy 
compares its payoff with that of another agent (e.g., y), randomly chosen from the 
population9,10,21. Depending on the payoff comparison, agent x either sticks to its original 
strategy or imitates the strategy of agent y. Agent y only plays a benchmark role and its 
strategy remains intact. In spatial version, agent y is randomly chosen from agent x’s 
immediate neighbors8,11-15. Obviously, imitation dynamics cannot introduce the available 
strategies which are not played by agent x and y. However, behavioral experiments6,7
imply that humans have higher possibility to explore new strategic options in social 
interactions. The common solutions provided by theorists are to combine imitation and 
mutation dynamics linearly10,21-24. That is, the agents not only imitate others but also act 
emotionally. 
Traditionally, public goods game (PGG) can be considered as a very useful game 
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theoretical model to qualitatively study the problem of maintaining cooperation in a 
group of unrelated individuals5-11,21,27-29. In our model, the voluntary PGG on square 
lattice with periodic boundary conditions8,11 is considered. Each player is confined to a 
site on the lattice and interacts only with its local neighborhood. In each decision round, 
the players either can refuse to participate (as a loner L), and will then obtain a small 
fixed payoff, or can join the PGG. In the latter case, they either can contribute some fixed 
amount to a common pool (as a cooperator C), or can make null contributions (as a 
defector D). The payoff a participant achieves in PGG depends on its own strategy as 
well as the composition of its local neighborhood. 
We investigate the consequences with 150 students in 6 sessions of 25 students that 
played the spatial voluntary public goods game for 40 consecutive rounds. The students 
observed the introduction to the game including an example on a large screen. They were 
told that they would have a starting account of 5 CNYs (China Yuan) and would interact 
anonymously by means of computer screens. In each round, they could choose 
simultaneously between three available options, which were presented in a neutral 
language. After each round, they were informed about the choices and payoffs of its 
neighbors as well as its own payoff in the last round. The experiment was computerized 
and conducted by using the software z-tree30. There were ten practice periods before the 
actual experiment in order to make the players familiar with the procedures. 
For later convenience of discussion, we let x  (i.e., unit of x) denote the agent x and its 
4 immediate neighbors, ( )s , where ( , , )s C D L  represents the neighbors’ strategy in 
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the last round, denote the probability an agent switching to the other strategy  which 
was played by its neighbors, 
s
( )B s  denote the probability agent x switching to the other 
strategy  which performed best on average in s x , ( )W s  denote the probability 
agent x switching to the other strategy  which performed worst on average in s x ,
( )s  denote the probability an agent switching (mutating) to the other strategy  which 
was not played by its neighbors respectively.
s
Although imitation dynamics have a wide class of microscopic update rules, they all 
assure that strategies which perform better on average in the neighborhood have higher 
chances to be imitated than those which perform worse on average do8,11-15. To verify this 
prediction, we examined the probabilities of an agent transiting to the other strategies in 
our experiments (see Fig. 1). We found that ( )s  is significantly lower than ( )B s
(P=0.006, n=18; Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=-2.75, two-tailed), and significantly higher 
than ( )sW  (P<0.001, n=18; Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=3.47, two-tailed). This 
implies that the individual behaviors are strongly affected by the last-round payoff. The 
players are more likely to choose the strategy which performed better in the last round, 
which seems to accord with the prediction of imitation dynamics. However, most of the 
imitation dynamics8-10,14-21 do not allow for an inferior strategy to replace a more 
successful one, i.e., imitation only occurs if the target strategy is more successful. This is 
significantly different from the results of our experiments in which agents frequently 
transited to the strategy whose average payoff is lowest in their own units (see Fig. 1.). 
Hence, we argue that investigating the evolution of human cooperation with imitation 
dynamics only might be inappropriate. 
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In fact, mutation took place frequently in our experiments. It is known that an agent 
cannot switch to the strategy which is not played by its 4 immediate neighbors via 
imitation dynamics. For example, agent x will not transit to C or D strategy via imitation 
if the agents in x  are all loners. We examined the case where all the players in x
were loners. We found that such case took place 205 times in all the six sessions of our 
experiments, 21.0% of agent x transited to C strategy, and 26.8% of agent x transited to D 
strategy. To be precise, we have also examined the rates agent transiting to strategy C or 
D via mutation (see Fig. 2), and found that the average mutation rates in our experiments 
are significantly higher than 50% (P=0.011, n=18; Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=2.54, 
two-tailed). This evidence further indicates that only imitation dynamics cannot provide a 
reasonable explanation to the behaviors of human decision making in social interaction. 
That is, the future study of evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus 
on the point why the individuals mutate and how. 
Theorists solved this problem by adding mutation rates to the imitation dynamics10,21-24.
Consequently, the probability an agent switching to the other strategy is the sum of 
probability agent transiting via imitation and mutation dynamics. That is, this dynamics 
(involving imitation and mutation) will predict that ( ) ( )B s s   because the 
probability an agent imitating the strategy which performed best on average in its own 
unit must be greater than zero, and that ( ) ( )W s s   because the probability an agent 
imitating the strategy which performed worst on average in its own unit is close to zero. 
To verify it, we examined the probabilities agents transiting to the other strategy via 
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mutation (see Fig. 3). We found that ( )B s  approximates to ( )s  (P=0.187, n=18; 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=1.32, two-tailed), and ( )W s  is significantly lower than 
( )s  (P=0.002, n=18; Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z=-3.08, two-tailed). The dynamics 
combining imitation and mutation perhaps can explain the consequence ( ) ( )B s s 
( )W s
with agents imitating the strategy whose average payoff are the best in their units with a 
very small probability, but they cannot give us an appropriate reason why   is 
lower than ( )s .
Furthermore, our experiments show that the probabilities agents mutating to different 
target strategy are significantly distinct (see Fig. 3). Precisely, we found that ( )L  is the 
highest (45.09 6.74%), ( )D  takes the second order (31.61 3.59%), and ( )C  is 
the lowest (22.60 4.91%). This implies that general mutation dynamics, which suggest 
that agents will explore the other strategy randomly, seem to be maladaptive. Perhaps 
non-uniform mutation dynamics could fit the experiment results by setting 

( )s  for 
each target strategy, but they cannot explain why the agents are more likely to be loners 
than to be cooperators or defectors. 
Why is the tendency of an agent’s options for different target strategies distinct? 
Surprisingly, we found that the probabilities agents mutating to various target strategies 
are similar to the average frequencies of the three strategies (45.77 6.37% loners; 
31.20 3.03% defectors; 23.03 3.82% cooperators). The intuition behind this is that the 
players in our experiments might play mixed strategies, which are probability distribution 


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over pure strategies, and come up with one of their feasible actions with a certain 
pre-assigned probability in each decision round even if the actions are not successful in 
the earlier round. The effect of last-round payoff can be described as that agents would 
increase the tendency to choose the strategy which performed better in the last round, and 
vice versa, that is, agent’s mixed strategies change continually according to the 
information it obtained. Hence we argue that the difference among values of ( )C ,
( )D , and ( )L  is result from the memory of human, i.e., the game’s earlier history 
might have a strong impact on the behavior of human decision making. For example, 
agents always know that they would obtain a fixed payoff 1.0 game point if they refuse to 
participate in the game. Consequently, the agent has higher chance to choose L strategy 
when the average payoffs of C and D strategy are lower than 1.0, even if no agents played 
L strategy in its unit. We had examined this case where the agent’s unit is composed of 
cooperators and defectors. We found that 46.8% agents transited to L strategy when the C 
and D’s average payoffs are lower than 1.0, and 31.3% agents transited to L strategy 
when both average payoffs of C and D are higher than 1.0. These results approximate to 
those obtained in Figure 1. 
Our evidence has profound implication for the study of human behaviors in social 
interactions. In the past, most research has focused on the imitation, mutation, and the 
combination of imitation and mutation. We found experimentally that all these dynamics 
might not provide an appropriate explanation to the behavior of human decision making. 
By analyzing the probability agent switching to the other strategy in different cases, our 
study indicates that the memory of human plays an important role in human decision 
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making. Thus, our evidence suggests that the evolution study of human cooperation in 
social interactions should include a focus on explaining how the memory of human 
works.
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Methods
A total of 150 subjects (76 men, 74 women) of Nankai University played a public goods 
game with optional participation on a 5	5 square lattice with period boundary that lasted 
for 40 rounds. Each experiment was begun by agents’ seeing the introduction to the game 
including one example round on a large screen, answering one or two test questions to 
verify understanding of the payoffs, and playing 10 practice periods. We mimicked a 
larger lattice by telling the students that there was a pool of additional players in the form 
of strategies recorded from earlier sessions, and each of them and the additional players 
would be confined to a site on a larger square lattice randomly at the start of actual 
periods. The students sat between partitions, and interacted anonymously through the 
software z-Tree30. They did not know the total number of rounds. 
In each round, all the players had to choose simultaneously between three available 
options (loners, cooperators, and defectors), which were presented in a neutral language 
(e.g., A, B, C strategy). The payoff score a subject obtained depends on its own decision 
as well as the decisions of the players it interacted. For the sake of convenience, we 
defined subject x and its 4 neighbors as unit of x, and characterize the payoff scores the 
subjects obtained in a unit only. In one single unit, the players L who refused to join the 
public group receive a fixed score 0.2 game points (GP). Of the rest players who were all 
willing to participate, C contributed 0.2 GPs to the common pool, and D made null 
contribution. Then the content of the pool was multiplied by 3, and divided evenly among 
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the participants (i.e., C and D). For example, there were 2 cooperators, 2 defectors, and 1 
loner in a unit. The scores for L, C, and D are then 0.2 GPs, 0.1GPs, and 0.3 GPs 
respectively. The actual score for a subject is accumulated over 5 units, i.e., by summing 
up the subject’s performance in its own unit as well as in the units of its 4 neighbors. 
After each round, they were shown the choices and payoff scores of its 4 neighbors as 
well as its own score in the current period. At the end of the sessions, they were presented 
with the final scores.  
In each session, the students were paid a 5 CNYs show-up fee. Their final score summed 
over all actual rounds was multiplied by 0.5 CNYs to determine additional earned 
incomes, i.e., one game point corresponded to 0.5 CNYs. The average payment per 
subject was 23.45 CNYs and the average session length was 1.0h. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1| The rates agents transiting to different target strategies. Black bars 
refer to the average probabilities an agent transiting to the strategies which 
perform best on average in its own unit, i.e., ( )B s . Light gray bars refer to the 
average probabilities an agent transiting to the strategies which perform worst on 
average in its own unit, i.e., ( )W s . White bars refer to the average probabilities 
an agent transiting to the target strategies which are played by its neighbors, i.e., 
( )s . Columns show mean s.e.m. per session of 25 subjects. 
Figure 2| Transition rates via mutation dynamics under different conditions.
It is known that agent x can not transit to the strategy which does not occurred in 
its unit via imitation. Hence, the transition rates presented above are due to 
mutation. a, the rates agent x mutating to C and D when agents in its unit are all 
loners. b, the rate focal agent mutating to C when its unit is composed of loners 
and cooperators. c, the rate focal agent mutating to D when its unit is composed 
of loners and defectors. d, the rate focal agent mutating to L when its unit is 
composed of defectors and cooperators. 
Figure 3| Rates an agent transiting to various target strategies via mutation.
It is shown that the probability an agent transiting to the strategy which is not 
played in this agent’s unit. Columns show mean  s.e.m. per session of 25 
subjects.
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Figure 2. 
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